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SUBMARINE CABLES, CYBERSECURITY 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN 
INTERSECTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Tara Davenport* 
The international community’s ever-increasing reliance on the Internet and 
web-based information and communications technologies (“ICT”) has meant 
that cybersecurity is becoming one of the most pressing concerns in the 21st 
century. The International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”)1 has defined 
cybersecurity to mean “the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, se-
curity safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, 
best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber 
environment and organization and user’s assets.”2 The Distributed Denial of 
Service attacks against Estonia and Georgia in 2007 and 2008 respectively 
where coordinated botnets overwhelmed servers and shut down the Internet;3 
the disruption of the operation of centrifuges at an Iran nuclear facility by the 
Stuxnet worm in 2010;4 the sustained State-sponsored cyber-hacking program 
in China;5 and the discovery that national security agencies in the West have 
been carrying out mass surveillance of virtual communications for years have 
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 1 The International Telecommunications Union (“ITU”) is the leading U.N. agency that 
establishes international standards for information and communication technology. See 
About ITU, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, http://www.itu.int/en/about (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). 
 2 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, REC. ITU-T X.1205, SERIES X: DATA NETWORKS, OPEN 
SYSTEM COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY 2 (2008), 
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/ITU-080418-RecomOverviewOfCS.pdf. 
 3 Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 837-38 
(2012). 
 4 Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon, 
WIRED (Nov. 3, 2015, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-
stuxnet/. 
 5 David Barboza & Kevin Drew, Security Firm Sees Global Cyberspying, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 3, 2011 at A11. 
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elevated cybersecurity to the forefront of global attention.6 
The discussions on cybersecurity in international policy and academic cir-
cles have focused primarily on how to protect the information that exists in 
cyberspace.7 A glaring omission from this discussion is the security of the 
physical infrastructure that underpins the virtual cloud of cyberspace, namely 
the security of the submarine fiber optic network. These submarine communi-
cation cables—which are hidden from plain view—form a vast network on the 
seabed, are often no bigger than a garden hose, and transmit massive amounts 
of data across oceans.8 They provide over 95% of international telecommuni-
cations—not via satellites as is commonly assumed.9 The global submarine 
network is the “backbone” of the Internet, and enables the ubiquitous use of e-
mail, social media, phone and banking services;10 goods and services we now 
take for granted. As technology develops, uses for submarine fiber optic cables 
continue to evolve, and their utility goes beyond the mere transmission of da-
ta—these cables are now extensively relied upon by the military, the oil and 
gas industry, as well as the scientific community. 
Notwithstanding their status as critical communications infrastructure, sub-
marine cable systems remain vulnerable to a variety of emerging cybersecurity 
challenges. First, since September 11th, there has been a growing concern about 
submarine cable systems as targets—specifically, the possibility of what will 
be broadly described as intentional interference with submarine cable systems 
by State and/or non-State actors.11 This includes intentional damage to subma-
                                                 
 6 Ewen MacAskill et al., NSA Files: Decoded – What the Revelations Mean for You, 
THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 1, 2013) [hereinafter MacAskill et al., NSA Files], 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-
revelations-decoded#section/1. 
 7 See generally Press Release, The White House, Off. of the Press Sec’y, Securing 
Cyberspace: President Obama Announces New Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal and 
Other Cybersecurity Efforts (Jan. 13, 2015) (on file with author); Cheryl Pellerin, Defense, 
Intel Leaders: Cybersecurity Priorities Are Defense, Deterrence, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Sept. 
29, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/621018/defense-intel-
leaders-cybersecurity-priorities-are-defense-deterrence. 
 8 Christopher Intagliata & Marlisse Silver Sweeney, What Links the Global Internet? 
Wires Inside Tubes No Bigger Than a Garden Hose, PRI (Apr. 20, 2015. 8:00 AM), 
http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-04-20/what-links-global-internet-wires-inside-tubes-no-
bigger-garden-hose; Victoria Woollaston, Messages From the Deep: Interactive Map Plots 
the Sprawling Growth of the Submarine Cable Network Since 1989, DAILY MAIL (July 24, 
2014, 2:37 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2692774/Messages-deep-
Interactive-map-plots-sprawling-growth-submarine-cable-network-1989.html. 
 9 LIONEL CARTER ET AL., SUBMARINE CABLES AND THE OCEANS: CONNECTING THE 
WORLD 8 (2009), http://www.iscpc.org/publications/ICPC-UNEP_Report.pdf. 
 10 Tara Davenport, Submarine Communications Cables and Science: A New Frontier in 
Ocean Governance?, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND NEW CHALLENGES TO OCEAN LAW 209, 
209 (Harry N. Schreiber et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter Davenport, A New Frontier]. 
 11 Robert Beckman, Protecting Submarine Cables From Intentional Damage–The Secu-
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rine cables laid on the seabed, cable landing stations, as well as attacks against 
the virtual or cyber aspect of submarine cable systems when perpetrators hack 
into the network management systems used to operate cable systems.12 
Second, submarine cables can also be used as tools in cyber-espionage and 
intelligence gathering.13 The recent startling disclosure by Edward Snowden 
that, for instance, the United States and the United Kingdom have engaged in 
the “the largest programme [sic] of suspicionless surveillance in human histo-
ry”14 by “tapping directly into the Internet backbone,”15 namely the fiber optic 
cables, has catapulted this issue to the forefront of global discourse. 
As such, this Article will examine the relationship between submarine ca-
bles and cybersecurity in the context of these two challenges. Specifically, it 
will examine the applicable international law that could potentially address 
these two challenges and whether the current legal regimes are adequate in 
ensuring the security of the vast network of cables that cross the ocean floor, 
and thus the security of the world’s telecommunications systems. 
Part I will provide background on the development of submarine communi-
cations cables, its importance, and how the industry works. Part II will discuss 
the prevailing regime governing submarine cables as set out in the 1982 United 
Nations (U.N.) Convention on the Law of the Sea. Part III will examine the 
first threat to cybersecurity, namely intentional interference with submarine 
cable systems while Part IV will explore how submarine cables have been used 
as tools in cyber-espionage. Part V will set out some recommendations on what 
can be done to enhance the security of the submarine cable network. 
                                                                                                                 
rity Gap, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 281, 281 (Douglas R. 
Burnett, et al., eds. 2014) [hereinafter Beckman, Protecting Submarine Cables]; see gener-
ally David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close, N.Y 
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-presence-
near-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html?_r=1 (“Russian submarines and spy ships are ag-
gressively operating near the vital undersea cables that carry almost all global Internet 
communications, raising concerns among some American military and intelligence officials 
that the Russians might be planning to attack those lines in times of tension or conflict.”). 
 12 Beckman, Protecting Submarine Cables, supra note 11, at 283. 
 13 Olga Khazan, The Creepy, Long-Standing Practice of Undersea Cable Tapping, THE 
ATLANTIC (July 16, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/the-
creepy-long-standing-practice-of-undersea-cable-tapping/277855/. 
 14 Ewen MacAskill et al., GCHQ Taps Fibre-optic Cables For Secret Access to World’s 
Communications, THE GUARDIAN (June 21, 2013, 12:23 PM) [hereinafter MacAskill et al., 
GHCQ], http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-
communications-nsa. 
 15 Jon Street, Wikimedia Among Nine Groups Suing the NSA for ‘Tapping Directly Into 
the Internet Backbone’, THE BLAZE (Mar. 10, 2015, 10:55 PM), 
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/03/10/wikimedia-among-nine-groups-suing-the-nsa-
for-tapping-directly-into-the-internet-backbone/. 
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I. SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS CABLES: A PRIMER 
A. Development 
There are two main types of submarine cables: submarine communications 
cables used to transmit data communications16 and submarine power cables 
used to transmit electrical power from one location to another.17 Both are de-
signed for underwater use and are typically laid on or buried within the sea-
bed.18 These submarine communications cables are the basis of this Article and 
its discussion. 
The genesis of submarine cables can be traced to the early part of the 19th 
century and the development of the electric cable that used electricity to trans-
mit and receive information over significant distances.19 In 1850, the first sub-
marine telegraph cable, consisting of copper wires and gutta percha—a type of 
naturally produced latex—was laid across the English Channel from Dover, 
England to Calais, France.20 While this cable did not last more than a few mes-
sages, its creation marked the beginning of the submarine cable industry.21 Ad-
vances in laying technique, design, and material meant that submarine tele-
graph cables were becoming increasingly durable and “[b]y the early 20th cen-
tury, much of the world was connected by a network that enabled rapid com-
munication and dissemination of information for government, commerce and 
the public.”22 However, submarine telegraph cables soon faced growing com-
petition from radio telegraph technology, which had greatly improved during 
World War I.23 Facing the global depression of the 1930s, the submarine tele-
graph cable industry steadily declined.24 
The end of the submarine telegraph era, however, saw the emergence of a 
new submarine communications cable, namely the submarine telephone cable. 
During the 1930s, a polyethylene-encased cable with a copper coaxial core was 
                                                 
 16 See, e.g., Submarine Network Solutions: Crossing Oceans to Connect the Planet, 
ALCATEL-LUCENT, https://www.alcatel-lucent.com/solutions/submarine-networks (last visit-
ed Oct. 5, 2015). 
 17 See Patrick J. Kiger, New Energy Projects Boost the Use of Undersea Power Cables, 
NAT’L GEO. (Aug. 18, 2014, 11:03 AM), 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/08/140819-submarine-power-cables-
offshore-wind/. 
 18 Intagliata & Silver Sweeney, supra note 8. 
 19 Stewart Ash, The Development of Submarine Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 19, 20 (Douglas R. Burnett, et al., eds., 2014). 
 20 CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 12. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 13. 
 23 Ash, supra note 19, at 27-28. 
 24 Id. 
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developed which allowed multiple voice channels to be realized.25 In 1955 and 
1956, two cables were laid between Scotland and Newfoundland called TAT-1 
and thus began the age of submarine coaxial telephone communications.26 Dur-
ing the 1960s, there were a slew of technological developments in design and 
laying techniques that enabled longer cables to be laid deeper in the ocean.27 
However, as with submarine telegraph cables, submarine telephone cables 
soon faced competition from satellite communications due to the former’s 
lower capacity and relatively high cost.28 During the 1970s and 1980s, satellites 
emerged as the primary means of telecommunications.29 The last submarine 
telephone cable was laid between India and the United Arab Emirates in 1986 
bringing the submarine telephone cable era to an end.30 
That was not, however, the end of the submarine cable story. In 1966, two 
scientists made a discovery that would revolutionize telecommunications.31 Dr. 
Charles Kao and Dr. George Hockham found “a fibre [sic] of glassy material 
constructed in a cladded structure” had “important potential as a new form of 
communication medium . . . compared with existing coaxial and radio sys-
tems” due to its “large information capacity and possible advantages in basic 
material cost.”32 This milestone discovery facilitated the development of terres-
trial fiber optic systems in the late 1970s and in 1980, the first sea trial of a 
submarine fiber optic system occurred.33 In 1986, a series of fiber optic subma-
rine cables were installed, and thus began the fiber-optics era.34 In 1988, the 
first trans-oceanic fiber optic cable linking the United States, United Kingdom, 
and France was installed and from this year onwards, submarine cables “start-
ed to outperform satellites in terms of the volume, speed and economics of data 
and voice communications.”35 This coincided with the release of the commer-
cial Internet in the mid-1990s.36 Essentially, these two technologies taken to-
gether revolutionized telecommunications: 
                                                 
 25 CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 14. 
 26 Id. (noting that the submarine telephone cables carried 707 calls between London and 
North America on the first day of operation). 
 27 Id. at 14-15. 
 28 Ash, supra note 19, at 32. 
 29 CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 15. 
 30 Ash, supra note 19, at 32. 
 31 G.A. Hockham & K.C. Kao, Dialectric-fibre Surface Waveguides for Optical Fre-
quencies, 113 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INST. OF. ELEC. ENG’RS, no.7, July 1966, at 1151, 1158. 
 32 G.A. Hockham & K.C. Kao, Dialectric-fibre Surface Waveguides for Optical Fre-
quencies, 113 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INST. OF. ELEC. ENG’RS, no.3, July 1986, at 198. 
 33 See Ash, supra note 19, at 33-34. 
 34 See id. at 34. 
 35 CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 16. 
 36 See Barry M. Leiner et. al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC., 
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-internet 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2015). 
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[C]ables carried large volumes of voice and data traffic with speed and security; the 
internet made that data and information accessible and usable for a multitude of pur-
poses. As a result, communications, business, commerce, education and entertainment 
underwent radical change.37 
Today’s modern submarine communications cables consist of a set of six to 
24 glass fibers, an electrical conductor, an internal steel strength member, and 
a protective sheath of marine grade polypropylene, which are constructed to 
withstand harsh environmental conditions for up to 25 years.38 Depending on 
where it is laid, a cable may have a protective armor (used on the continental 
shelf) composed of steel wires.39 Cables without protective armor are usually 
laid in the deep ocean and are typically 17-20 millimeter (mm) diameter, 
whereas armored fiber-optic cables may reach 50 mm diameter.40 “Cable sec-
tions and amplifiers, which boost the light signals carried by the glass fibers, 
are assembled into a nearly complete system, coiled in tanks in a factory and 
then loaded onto special cable-laying ships for installation.”41 
B. Critical Communications Infrastructure 
The United Nations, in 2010, described submarine communications cables 
as “critical communications infrastructure” and “vitally important to the global 
economy and the national security of all States.”42 This is not an understate-
ment. Today, submarine fiber optic cables provide the vast majority of interna-
tional telecommunications—some 95% overall.43 The global cable network is 
composed of an estimated 213 independent cable systems amounting to ap-
proximately 877,122 kilometers of fiber optic cables.44 The majority of coun-
                                                 
 37 CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 16. 
 38 Ronald J. Rapp, Director, Cable Eng’g & Tech., Tyco Elec. Subsea Commc’n LLC, 
Submarine Cables: Critical Infrastructure Supplier Perspective, Address Before the 34th 
Annual Center for Oceans Law and Policy Conference 5 (May 21, 2010) [hereinafter Rapp, 
Submarine Cables], http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/Rapp-Presentation.pdf. 
 39 Ronald J. Rapp, Director, Indus. & Mar. Liason, TE SubCom, Cable Laying and Re-
pair – Cable Ship Operations, Address Before the Submarine Cables in the Sargasso Sea 
Workshop 6 (Oct. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Rapp, Cable Laying & Repair], 
http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/Rapp-Presentation.pdf. 
 40 Id. at 7. 
 41 DOUGLAS BURNETT ET AL., SUBMARINE CABLES IN THE SARGASSO SEA: LEGAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION 10 (2015) [hereinafter 
BURNETT ET AL., WORKSHOP REPORT], 
http://cil.nus.edu.sg/cil-news-highlights/submarine-cables-in-the-sargasso-sea-final-
workshop-report-published/ 
 42 G.A. Res. 65/37, ¶ 121 (Dec. 7, 2010). 
 43 CARTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 8. 
 44 Douglas Burnett et al., Introduction: Why Submarine Cables? to SUBMARINE CABLES: 
THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 1, 2 (Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014). 
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tries now rely on submarine cables for their communications needs and as of 
mid-2012, only 21 nations and territories remain unconnected to the fiber net-
work with several of them having projects underway.45 The global submarine 
network forms the backbone of the Internet, and consequently e-mail, social 
media, phone and banking services; goods and services we now take for grant-
ed. 
With regard to financial services, it has been estimated that submarine ca-
bles “carry an excess of 10 trillion [U.S. dollars] a day in transactions.”46 Simi-
larly, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications 
(SWIFT) relies on cables to transmit financial data to “more than 8,300 mem-
ber financial institutions in 195 countries.”47 “The U.S. Clearing House Inter-
bank Payment System processes over 1 trillion [dollars] a day to more than 22 
countries.”48 
From a global and national security perspective, submarine communications 
cables also play an essential role. For example, “a major portion of the [U.S. 
Department of Defense] data traveling on undersea cables is unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) video, essential for war preparation.”49 As one scholar ob-
served, “without ensured cable connectivity, the future of modern warfare is in 
jeopardy.”50 A further example of the importance of cables to the military is the 
development of the Global Information Grid (GiG) by the U.S. Department of 
Defense.51 The GiG is the “globally, interconnected, end-to-end set of infor-
mation capabilities for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating and man-
aging information on demand to warfighters, policy makers and support per-
sonnel.”52 The Grid utilizes portions of the international telecommunications 
systems and has been described as a “global network that can be used to con-
trol a global battlespace.”53 
Another recently developed use for submarine fiber optic cables is providing 
                                                 
 45 Id. 
 46 Michael Sechrist, New Threats, Old Technology: Vulnerabilities In Undersea Com-
munications Cable Network Management Systems 9 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Belfer Ctr. for 
Sci. & Int’l Affs., Discussion Paper No. 2012-03, 2012) [hereinafter Sechrist, New Threats], 
https://citizenlab.org/cybernorms2012/sechrist.pdf. 
 47 Id. at 10. 
 48 Id. 
 49 MICHAEL SECHRIST, CYBERSPACE IN DEEP WATER: PROTECTING UNDERSEA COMMU-
NICATION CABLES BY CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 6 (2010) 
[hereinafter SECHRIST, DEEP WATER], 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/PAE_final_draft_-_043010.pdf. 
 50 Id. at 5.  
 51 Id.; see generally Global Information Grid, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, 
https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/global_information_grid/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2015). 
 52 Global Information Grid, supra note 51. 
 53 Robert Fonow, Cybersecurity Demands Physical Security, SIGNAL MAG., Feb. 2006, 
at 43, 44, http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=cybersecurity-demands-physical-security. 
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connectivity for offshore oil and gas installations.54 “Communications between 
onshore facilities and offshore oil and gas facilities have historically been a 
challenge for the oil and gas industry” due to distance to land and space con-
straints on the installation itself.55 Submarine fiber optic cables are now being 
increasingly utilized to link onshore oil and gas facilities to a variety of assets 
based in the sea, including conventional fixed platforms, floating platforms, 
and storage.56 This facilitates real-time monitoring with sensors, collaboration, 
video surveillance, and work management systems as well as other applica-
tions that require continuous connectivity.57 
Additionally, submarine communications cables are proving invaluable for 
scientific development.58 In recent years, developments in technology have 
allowed submarine communications cables to be used for the collection of 
oceanographic data from the marine environment.59 In this facet, “scientists 
have utilized submarine communications cables to transport data in real time 
from ocean observatories that collect oceanographic data.”60 Additionally, 
“there has been interest in using submarine communications cables not to just 
transport data but also to collect data by placing scientific sensors on these ca-
bles.”61 Scientists believe that the placement of sensors on these cables will 
allow for the collection of data on ocean temperature, salinity, and water pres-
sure which could lead to disaster risk reduction and real-time monitoring of the 
oceans and climate.62 
The many uses for communications cables are boundless and in many ways, 
submarine cables have emerged as one of the most important uses of the 
oceans. There is no doubt these “unseen and unsung cables are the true skele-
ton and nerve of our world, linking our countries together in a fiber optic 
web.”63 
                                                 
 54 See generally Wayne F. Nielsen & Tara Davenport, Submarine Cables and Offshore 
Energy, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 351, 351-54 (Douglas 
R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014). 
 55 Id. at 351. 
 56 Id. at 353. 
 57 Id.; see GoM Fiber Optic Network, BP GLOBAL, http://www.gomfiber.com/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 3, 2015). 
 58 See generally Lionel Carter & Alfred H.A Soons, Marine Scientific Research Cables, 
in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 323, 325-28 (Douglas R. Bur-
nett et al. eds., 2014); see also Davenport, A New Frontier, supra note 10, at 210-13. 
 59 Davenport, A New Frontier, supra note 10, at 210. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id.; see also RHETT BUTLER, USING SUBMARINE CABLES FOR CLIMATE MONITORING AND 
DISASTER WARNING 3 (2012), https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-
t/oth/4B/04/T4B040000150001PDFE.pdf. 
 63 U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 59th plen. mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. A/65/PV.59 (Dec. 7, 2010). 
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C. The Submarine Cable Industry 
Two brothers, Jacob and John Brett, formed a British company called the 
English Channel Submarine Telegraph Company and developed the first sub-
marine cable that was laid between Dover and Calais in 1850.64 Telegraphs 
were perceived as benefitting trade and commerce, and thus it was inevitable 
that the industry would be driven by private investment.65 This private com-
mercial model employed by the Brett Brothers shaped the way in which the 
industry would develop and this structure remains prevalent today.66 In the ear-
ly stages, “British companies, with the assistance of the Empire, owned and 
controlled the vast majority of the submarine [telegraph] cable network.”67 
However, other powers like France, Germany and Russia “were jarred to reali-
ty by the way in which Britain had put its control over large portions of the 
global telegraph cable infrastructure to great strategic and military advantage 
during the war,” and thus they began their own cable laying program to shatter 
the British monopoly.68 Indeed, in order to break their dependence on British 
cables, other countries started to investigate other technologies, such as the 
wireless telegraph, which in part caused the demise of the telegraph.69 
Today, there are many private cable enterprises from various jurisdictions. 
There are two main types of cable companies involved in the industry.70 The 
first category is the cable system owner that owns and/or operates the system.71 
They can consist of national telecommunications carriers, private companies 
and/or investment banks.72 A trans-oceanic cable can cost up to 500 million 
U.S. dollars, and therefore, more often than not, these companies form consor-
tiums of about 20-30 telecommunications companies to fund the design, con-
struction, and maintenance of a new cable in return for a proportionate share of 
capacity.73 
                                                 
 64 GRAEME MARETT, A HISTORY OF THE TELEGRAPH IN JERSEY: 1858 – 1940, at 2-3 
(2009), http://www.marett.org/telecom/telegraph.pdf. 
 65 Jonathon W. Penney, The Cycles of Global Telecommunication Censorship and Sur-
veillance, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 693, 704 (2015). 
 66 Id. at 703. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 716. 
 69 Id. at 721. 
 70 Mick Green, The Submarine Cable Industry: How Does it Work?, in SUBMARINE 
CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 41, 42 (Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 43. 
 73 Id. at 46. For example, the Southern Cross Cable, which is located in Australian wa-
ters provides international bandwidth to Australia, New Zealand, Hawaii, and the continen-
tal United States. It cost $1.5 billion dollars to build and is jointly owned by Telecom New 
Zealand, SingTel Optus and Verizon Business. See Our Company: About Southern Cross, S. 
CROSS CABLES NETWORK, http://www.southerncrosscables.com/home/company (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2015). 
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The second category of cable companies comprises the cable suppliers who 
are responsible for the construction, operation, and maintenance of submarine 
cables.74 These include the system suppliers who design, plan, and manufacture 
the cable system; the marine service suppliers who provide specialist vessels 
for cable installation operations; and the cable joint suppliers who supply joints 
and associated equipment required to replace damaged cables with new ca-
bles.75 
The International Cable Protection Committee (“ICPC”), established in 
1958, is an industry-based organization whose members include owners, op-
erators, and suppliers of over 97 percent of the world’s international submarine 
cable systems.76 In 2010, membership was opened to governments, and several 
governments are now represented.77 The ICPC issues Recommendations on 
various issues concerning submarine cables and has been instrumental in work-
ing with governments, international organizations, and other seabed users to 
preserve the integrity of the submarine cable network.78 
At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that cables, unlike vessels, are not reg-
istered to any nationality.79 The consortia or private companies that own and 
operate them are from various countries, as are the cable suppliers that con-
struct them. One cable can span many different jurisdictions and for this rea-
son, submarine cables are the very essence of transnational infrastructure. 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING SUBMARINE 
CABLES 
Submarine cables were recognized early on as a public good that ought to be 
protected and regulated.80 From 1863 to 1913, the protection of submarine ca-
bles appeared on the agenda of seven international conferences.81 Between 
1884 and 1982, the international community adopted four legal instruments 
that addressed the rights and obligations of States vis-à-vis submarine cables. 
These are: (1) the 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph 
                                                 
 74 Green, supra note 70, at 42. 
 75 Id. at 42-44. 
 76 See About the ICPC, INT’L CABLE PROT. COMM. (Jul. 24, 2015), 
https://www.iscpc.org/about-the-icpc/. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See e.g., ICPC Recommendations, INT’L CABLE PROT. COMM. (Dec. 22, 2014), 
https://www.iscpc.org/publications/recommendations/. 
 79 Convention on the High Seas, art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 83-84 [hereinaf-
ter High Seas Convention]. 
 80 United Nations Documents on the Development and Codification of International 
Law, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 29, 33-34 (1947). 
 81 Id. 
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Cables (“1884 Cable Convention”);82 (2) the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
High Seas;83 (3) the 1958 Convention on Continental Shelf;84 and (4) the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).85 
The 1884 Cable Convention is a stand-alone convention dealing solely with 
the protection of submarine telegraph cables.86 The convention’s primary goal 
was to require State adoption of legislation that protected cables laying outside 
of territorial waters;87 and presently has 40 State Parties.88 
The 1958 Geneva Conventions on the High Seas and the Continental Shelf 
(“the 1958 Geneva Conventions”) and UNCLOS are broad, comprehensive 
treaties that address various aspects of law of the sea. For purposes of this Ar-
ticle, UNCLOS is assumed to be the applicable legal regime governing subma-
rine cables.89 
The adoption of UNCLOS in 1982 was a milestone in international law and 
relations.90 The 320 articles and 9 annexes, often described as a “constitution 
for the oceans”91 took nine years to negotiate and involved more than 140 
States, six non-independent States, eight national liberation movements, 12 
specialized agencies, 19 intergovernmental organizations, and a number of 
quasi-autonomous units of the U.N.92 One hundred and nineteen States signed 
                                                 
 82 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, Mar. 14, 1884, 24 
Stat. 989, T.S. No 380 [hereinafter 1884 Cable Convention]. 
 83 High Seas Convention, supra note 79, at 82. 
 84 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter 
Continental Shelf Convention]. 
 85 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 86 See generally 1884 Cable Convention, supra note 82, art. 1. 
 87 Douglas R. Burnett et al., Overview of the International Legal Regime Governing 
Submarine Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 63, 66 
(Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter Burnett et al., Overview]. 
 88 Id. at 64. 
 89 UNCLOS has received widespread acceptance and presently has 167 Parties. See 
Status of U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLL., 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-
6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). For parties to both the 
1958 Geneva Conventions and UNCLOS, the latter supersedes the former. See UNCLOS, 
supra note 85, art. 311, ¶ 1. Further, most of the UNCLOS provisions on submarine cables 
are based on the provisions found in the 1958 High Seas Convention which codified existing 
customary international law. See Burnett, Overview, supra note 87, at 65. These provisions 
are consequently binding on non-parties. Id. 
 90 See generally The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (a historical 
perspective), U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFF. & THE LAW OF THE SEA, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
 91 See Tommy T.B. Koh, Former Singapore Ambassador to the United Nations, Re-
marks Before the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Dec. 11, 1982), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf. 
 92 For an overview of the negotiating history of the Third Conference on the Law of the 
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the Convention and it presently has 167 States Parties.93 UNCLOS purports to 
establish a “legal order for the seas and oceans”94 by demarcating zones of ju-
ridical competence and assigning different rights and obligations to coastal 
States and other users of the sea.95 These maritime zones can be generally cate-
gorized as (1) areas under territorial sovereignty (the territorial sea, archipelag-
ic waters, straits used for international navigation); (2) areas outside sovereign-
ty but within national jurisdiction (the Exclusive Economic Zone and Conti-
nental Shelf) and (3) areas beyond national jurisdiction (high seas and the deep 
seabed).96 
UNCLOS addresses the rights and obligations of States for both the protec-
tion of submarine cables and the freedom to lay, repair and maintain such ca-
bles (the installation of cables), the scope and extent of which are determined 
by where these cable activities are taking place.97 
A. The Installation of Submarine Cables 
Cable installation on the seabed involves three distinct phases. First, the op-
timal cable route must be determined.98 This initially involves a Desktop Sur-
vey, which takes into account landing sites, seabed bathymetry and geology, 
fishing and anchoring uses, cable and pipeline crossings, permitting require-
ments of coastal States and other constraints, such as boundaries.99 The Desk-
top Survey is followed by a cable route survey by a survey vessel in order to 
“fully characterize that route and to avoid hazards and/or environmentally sig-
                                                                                                                 
Sea, see Tommy T.B. Koh & Shanmugam Jayakumar, The Negotiating Process of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in 1 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 29-68 (Myron Nordquist et al. eds., 1985) 
[hereinafter 1 UNCLOS COMMENTARY]. 
 93 See Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Con-
vention and 
the Related Agreements as at 3 October 2014, U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFF. & THE LAW OF 
THE SEA, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
 94 UNCLOS, supra note 85, pmbl. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. arts. 2, 46, 55, 76, 86. 
 97 Id. arts. 79, 112, 113. 
 98 Subsea Cables – Installation Procedures and Methods, KINGFISHER INFO. SERV.-
OFFSHORE RENEWABLE & CABLES AWARENESS, http://www.kis-orca.eu/subsea-
cables/installation-procedures-and-methods#.Vg8GoxNViko (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
 99 See generally Graham Evans & Monique Page, The Planning and Surveying of Sub-
marine Cable Routes, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 93, 94-
95 (Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014). 
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nificant zones that may not have been identified from existing information.”100 
“The selection of the final route is determined by a cost-benefit analysis of the 
cost of laying a cable along a particular route versus the need to protect the 
cable.”101 Thus, the final selection will be the route that best “avoid[s] hazards 
and obstacles such as fishing areas, anchorages, military operation areas, muni-
tions or other dumping areas and environmentally sensitive areas.”102 
The second stage is the laying of the cable on the seabed.103 A cable is de-
ployed along the previously designated route by trained crew on specialized 
cable-laying vessels, which spool the cable out of huge holding tanks.104 De-
pending on the route, the cable will either be buried beneath the seabed or laid 
on the seabed surface. Typically, cables will be surface laid in water depths 
deeper than 1500 meters—a depth beyond the reach of risky human activities 
such as anchoring and fishing.105 Once laid on the seabed close to land, cables 
cross a beach and enter a “beach manhole”, running a land route until it reach-
es the cable landing station, a shore terminal building.106 In short, the beginning 
and ending points of undersea cable systems are the landing stations which 
provide a gateway to landline communication networks.107 
The third stage is cable repair and maintenance.108 Typically, a cable’s 
lifespan is 15 – 20 years, during which time, it may need to be retrieved from 
the seabed for repairs or maintenance.109 Repairs entail finding the location of 
the cable, identifying the faulted section and replacing that section with a new 
cable.110 
1. The High Seas 
Since the laying of the first submarine cable in 1850, the freedom to lay 
submarine cables in the high seas has been unchallenged111 and subsequently 
                                                 
 100 CARTER ET AL., supra note 9 at 21. 
 101 BURNETT ET AL., WORKSHOP REPORT, supra note 41, at 10. 
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 104 See Keith Ford-Ramsden & Tara Davenport, The Manufacture and Laying of Subma-
rine Cables, in SUBMARINE CABLES: THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLICY 123, 127-28 
(Douglas R. Burnett et al. eds., 2014). 
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in Law and Practice, in 43 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 201, 204 (2012) [hereinafter Davenport, 
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3, 2012) (unpublished M.S.S. dissertation, U.S. Army War College) (on file with author). 
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affirmed in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas112 and UNCLOS.113 Article 
87 of UNCLOS states that the freedom of the high seas includes the freedom to 
lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI, on the continental 
shelf.114 Article 112 (1) of UNCLOS reinforces this by stipulating that “all 
States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the high 
seas beyond the continental shelf.”115 While not explicitly mentioned, there is 
no doubt that survey, repair and maintenance activities that are an essential 
component of cable operations are included in the freedom to lay cables in the 
high seas.116 
However, the freedom is not completely unlimited. First, Article 112 (2) re-
quires States to have due regard to cables already in position and not to preju-
dice the possibility of repairing existing cables or pipelines.117 Second, the 
freedom to lay submarine cables must be exercised with due regard for the in-
terests of other States in their exercise of high seas freedoms (such as fishing 
and navigation) in addition to the due regard for the rights under UNCLOS 
                                                                                                                 
A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 781 (1962). The 1884 Cable Conven-
tion dealt only with the protection of submarine cables and not the freedom to lay cables 
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 112 See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, ¶ 192, 5 
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THE TREATIES 58, 92 (1999). 
 113 See UNCLOS, supra note 85, art. 112. 
 114 Id. art. 87, ¶ 1. This is in recognition of the fact that for cables which are laid on the 
extended continental shelf beyond 200 nm, the continental shelf regime on submarine cables 
and not the high seas regime will apply. 
 115 Id. art. 112, ¶ 1. 
 116 Id. art. 79, ¶ 5. Article 112 (2) of UNCLOS states that Article 79 (5) (found in Part VI 
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with respect to activities in the area where deep seabed mining takes place and 
that which is under the purview of the International Seabed Authority.118 
At this juncture, it warrants noting that UNCLOS affords the freedom to lay 
cables to “all States.”119 In reality, as previously mentioned, it is private com-
panies that own and operate cables, and it is private companies that lay and 
repair cables. The Virginia Commentary noted that the term “all States” should 
not be read restrictively as “[i]n practice, many submarine cables and pipelines 
are privately owned and are laid by corporations or other private entities. The 
term therefore refers to the right of States or their nationals to lay cables or 
pipelines.”120 
2. The Exclusive Economic Zone / Continental Shelf 
During the negotiations of UNCLOS, the long-recognized freedom to lay 
submarine cables on the high seas had to be adapted to take into account the 
interests of the coastal State and other States in the newly established maritime 
zones of the continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”).121 
Both these maritime zones are areas in which the coastal State did not have 
sovereignty but instead had sovereign rights to resources that could impact the 
freedom to lay cables and vice versa. 
Under the continental shelf regime in Part VI of UNCLOS, a coastal state 
has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the continental shelf and ex-
ploiting its natural resources,122 which include “mineral and other non-living 
resources of the seabed and subsoil.”123 The continental shelf is defined as: 
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the conti-
nental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental 
margin does not extend up to that distance.124 
The EEZ regime in Part V of UNCLOS, recognized the rights of the coastal 
State to claim a 200 nautical mile (nm) EEZ that gives coastal States sovereign 
rights to the exploration and exploitation of both living and non-living re-
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sources of “the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and sub-
soil.”125 A coastal State also has jurisdiction, as provided in UNCLOS, over 
artificial islands, installations, and structures; marine scientific research; and 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment in its EEZ.126 
Both the EEZ and the continental shelf regime give the coastal State two 
distinct legal bases for rights over the seabed within 200 nm. However, the 
negotiators of UNCLOS recognized the need to harmonize the content of the 
legal interest within two separate regimes that geographically overlapped.127 
Accordingly, Article 56 (3) of UNCLOS provides that the rights set out in the 
EEZ regarding the seabed and subsoil are to be “exercised in accordance with 
Part VI on the continental shelf [emphasis added].”128 The provisions on sub-
marine cables in Part V and Part VI, while not drafted in identical terms, essen-
tially result in the same rights and obligations with respect to submarine cables, 
in areas within 200 nm of the coast. In situations where a coastal state has an 
entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm (i.e. an outer continental 
shelf), the continental shelf regime solely applies.129 
UNCLOS affirms that all States have the freedom to lay submarine cables in 
the EEZ and continental shelf. In the EEZ, Article 58 provides: 
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, sub-
ject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in arti-
cle 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipe-
lines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such 
as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and 
pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention (emphasis add-
ed).130 
As mentioned above, Article 87 provides that freedoms of the high seas in-
clude the “freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI 
[on the continental shelf].”131 Similarly, Part VI reinforces this right on the con-
tinental shelf by stipulating in Article 79 (1) that “all States are entitled to lay 
                                                 
 125 Id. art. 56. 
 126 Id. 
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submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf in accordance with the 
provisions of this article.”132 
Laying of submarine cables also includes the right to repair and maintain 
them as these activities would be considered “other internationally lawful uses 
of the sea related to these freedoms . . . such as those associated with the opera-
tion of . . . submarine cables” in the EEZ.133 With regard to the continental 
shelf, Article 79 (1) does not explicitly refer to repair or maintenance, howev-
er, the rest of Article 79 assumes that the right to lay submarine cables includes 
the right to maintain and repair them.134 Similarly, cable route surveys should 
also be considered an “internationally lawful use of the sea related . . . to the 
operation of  . . . submarine cables” as they are essential to the laying of ca-
bles.135 
However, the right to lay submarine cables and associated rights is not un-
limited. First, States or companies conducting cable operations in the 
EEZ/continental shelf must have due regard to the cables or pipelines already 
in position and must not prejudice the possibilities of repairing existing cables 
or pipelines.136 
Second, such states or companies must have due regard to the rights and du-
ties of the coastal state in the EEZ137 and in the continental shelf, to the extent 
the latter overlaps with the EEZ. The rights and duties of the coastal State re-
fers to the rights and duties enumerated in Article 56 and elaborated on in other 
UNCLOS provisions, namely, rights over the exploration and exploitation of: 
living resources; nonliving resources; other economic resources such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents, and winds; jurisdiction over 
artificial islands, installations, and structures; jurisdiction over marine scien-
tific research; and jurisdiction over the protection and preservation of the ma-
rine environment, and the consequent duties that accompany such jurisdic-
tion.138 
Third, states conducting cable operations “shall comply with the laws and 
regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not 
incompatible with this Part.”139 The question is to what extent a coastal State 
can regulate cable operations in the EEZ/continental shelf. 
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In this regard, “UNCLOS has substantive provisions on the type of regula-
tions coastal States may adopt, as well as procedural obligations that must be 
complied with if such regulations are adopted.”140 First, Article 79 (2) of UN-
CLOS states: 
Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental 
shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention, reduction and con-
trol of pollution from pipelines, the coastal State may not impede the laying or 
maintenance of such cables or pipelines.141 
Article 79 (2) appears to distinguish between submarine cables and pipe-
lines. Specifically, with respect to pipelines, a coastal State is permitted to im-
pose reasonable measures for (1) the exploration of the continental shelf; (2) 
the exploitation of its natural resources and (3) the prevention, reduction, and 
control of pollution from pipelines.142 For submarine cables, a coastal State can 
only subject it to reasonable measures for the (1) exploration of the continental 
shelf and (2) the exploitation of its natural resources. This appears to be in 
recognition of the belief that submarine cables do not cause pollution.143 
Second, Article 79 (3) states that the “delineation of the course for the laying 
of such pipelines on the continental shelf is subject to the consent of the coastal 
State.”144 The clear implication is that the delineation of the course for subma-
rine cables is not subject to the consent of the coastal State. This is supported 
by the legislative history of the provision.145 However, it has been argued that 
the coastal State can still impose conditions for the delineation of the cable 
route pursuant to the right to impose “reasonable measures” for the exploration 
of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources as set out in 
Article 79 (3).146 For example, the coastal State could require that the route 
avoid areas in which offshore exploration/exploitation is taking place or areas 
that are intensively fished. 
Third, Article 79 (4) provides that nothing in Part VI “affects the right of the 
coastal State to establish conditions for cables or pipelines entering its territory 
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or territorial sea . . . .”147 This reflects the fact that in its territorial sea and land 
territory, coastal States have sovereignty over submarine cables and can im-
pose conditions for their operation within these areas. The purpose of this pro-
vision is to ensure: 
[T]he restrictions in article 79 on the right of a coastal State to regulate cables on the 
continental shelf [where it has sovereign rights but not sovereignty] does not affect the 
more extensive rights of the coastal State to impose additional conditions on cables 
which enter its territory or territorial sea [where it has sovereignty].148 
Apart from the above substantive rights that coastal States have in relation to 
the regulation of submarine cables, UNCLOS also imposes certain procedural 
obligations on coastal States when exercising their rights to regulate submarine 
cables. First, these measures must be “reasonable” as required in Article 79 
(2).149 The term “reasonable” is admittedly vague but “no more definite criteri-
on than that of reasonableness could be established for the measures which 
coastal states may take, for the reason that it was impossible to foresee all situ-
ations that might arise in the application of [this article].”150 The second proce-
dural obligation is that in the EEZ (and in the continental shelf to the extent it 
overlaps with the EEZ), a coastal state must have due regard to the rights and 
duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions 
of UNCLOS.151 Third, on the continental shelf (and in the EEZ to the extent it 
overlaps with the continental shelf), a coastal state must not exercise its rights 
in a manner that will infringe or result in “any unjustifiable interference” with 
navigation and other rights and freedoms of other states as provided for in 
UNCLOS.152 
3. Submarine Cables Under the Jurisdiction of the Coastal State 
UNCLOS provides for an exception to the freedom to lay submarine cables 
in the EEZ/continental shelf.153 Under Article 79 (4), submarine cables “used in 
connection with the exploration of its continental shelf or exploitation of its 
resources or the operations of artificial islands, installations and structures un-
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der its jurisdiction” are under the jurisdiction of the coastal State.154 
The coastal State’s jurisdiction over submarine cables under Article 79 (4) is 
a direct consequence of its sovereign rights over the resources of the continen-
tal shelf/EEZ as well as over other activities for the economic exploitation and 
exploration of the zone (such as the production of energy from water, currents 
and winds),155 and its jurisdiction over the establishment and use of artificial 
islands, installations, and structures.156 This provision would appear to apply to 
submarine communications and power cables used to provide communications 
for oil and gas platforms and wind farms. 
4. Territorial Seas 
Under UNCLOS, a coastal State has sovereignty over 12 nautical miles of 
sea known as the territorial sea.157 Pursuant to their sovereignty over the territo-
rial sea,158 coastal States clearly have extensive authority to regulate ships en-
gaged in cable operations (i.e. the surveying of cable routes and the laying, 
repair, and maintenance of cables in these maritime zones). Coastal States will 
usually require the whole gamut of permits, licenses, and environmental condi-
tions to be met before permission is given to deploy a power cable in these 
maritime zones.159 
B. The Protection of Submarine Cables 
The protection of submarine cables has always been a concern of the inter-
national community as early as the 1880s when the 1884 Cable Convention 
was adopted.160 Within the territorial sea, coastal States161 have an express right 
to adopt laws and regulations “relating to innocent passage through their terri-
torial sea” in order to protect submarine cables.162 They also have a general 
competence to enact laws to protect submarine cables within such territorial 
waters.163 However, under UNCLOS there is no obligation on coastal States to 
adopt laws and regulations to protect submarine cables within territorial wa-
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ters.164 
Outside territorial waters, namely the EEZ, continental shelf and high seas, 
there are express provisions in UNCLOS on the protection of cables that apply. 
Articles 113 to 115 of UNCLOS address the protection of submarine cables on 
the high seas and are based on three articles in the 1884 Cable Convention.165 
They are also applicable to submarine cables laid in the EEZ under Article 
58(2) as well as to cables laid on the continental shelf. 166 
Article 113 of UNCLOS requires States to adopt laws and regulations to 
provide that the breaking or injuring by a ship flying its flag or by a person 
subject to its jurisdiction of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done will-
fully or through culpable negligence, is a punishable offense.167 Such laws and 
regulations must also apply to conduct calculated or likely to result in such 
breaking or injuring. However, it shall not apply to any break or injury caused 
by persons whom acted to save lives or their ships, after having taken all nec-
essary precautions to avoid such an occurrence.168 Article 113 essentially ex-
tends a State’s criminal jurisdiction (usually limited to territory) over acts of 
breaking or injury to submarine cables done “willfully or through culpable 
negligence.”169 This extension of jurisdiction only applies to ships flying the 
State’s flag on the high seas or EEZ, or to its nationals whom commit such 
acts, consistent with general principles of international law on the prescription 
of extra-territorial jurisdiction.170 
Article 114 of UNCLOS, which is based on Article IV of the 1884 Cable 
Convention, requires every State to adopt laws and regulations concerning the 
liability of owners of cables for the cost of repairs to existing cables which are 
damaged in the course of laying or repair operations.171 
Article 115, which is based on Article VII of the 1884 Cable Convention, 
provides that every State should adopt laws and regulations to provide for an 
indemnity to be paid by cable owners to ship owners whose master sacrifices 
an anchor, a net or any other fishing gear in order to avoid injuring a subma-
rine cable, provided that the ship owner has taken all reasonable precautionary 
measures beforehand.172 
III. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH SUBMARINE CABLE 
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SYSTEMS 
Submarine cables are laid on the seabed and are vulnerable to a host of 
threats including fishing and shipping activity as well as natural hazards such 
as earthquakes. Eighty per cent of cable faults are estimated to be attributable 
to human activity, with fishing being responsible for more than 60 percent of 
all human activity faults.173 Cable faults can take several forms, including dam-
age to the outer insulation that results in seawater seeping in and damaging the 
power conductor as well as the optical fibers so that they can no longer trans-
mit light or a complete break in the cable.174 Cable owners and operators utilize 
Network Operations Centers (NOCs) to monitor data traffic “through their 
networks on a 24/7 basis and are able to immediately identify any interruption 
to the traffic or a change in the normal operating conditions of the marine por-
tion of the network.”175 
If an interruption does take place, the NOC operators will attempt to restore 
traffic as soon as possible by using other cable systems pursuant to a mutual 
restoration agreement.176 If there are multiple simultaneous failures, there may 
be significant delays in restoration.177 Quickly identifying the fault and deploy-
ing a cable repair ship to fix it as soon as possible is imperative.178 Given the 
predominant dependence that today’s world has on communications cables, an 
interruption in traffic could have serious consequences. For example, in a 2012 
report on the Economic Impact of Submarine Cable Disruptions, it was esti-
mated that the indirect economic costs of a fault in all the landing points in 
Australia would amount to 3.169 million U.S. dollars, mostly due to the loss of 
international internet traffic.179 
Since the September 11th attacks, there has been a growing concern about 
the possibility of what will be broadly described as intentional interference 
with submarine cable systems by State and/or non-State actors.180 In this re-
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gard, intentional interference can take two potential forms. First is intentional 
damage to the physical infrastructure of submarine cable systems, namely, 
submarine cables laid on the seabed and cable landing stations.181 The second 
type is an attack involving the virtual or cyber aspect of submarine cable sys-
tems, and the exploit would entail hacking into the cable network management 
systems used to operate cable systems and disrupting communications.182 Both 
will be dealt with in greater detail below. 
A. Intentional Damage to Submarine Cables and Cable Landing Stations 
The U.S. Department of Defense listed the world’s cable landing sites as 
among the most critical of infrastructures for the United States.183 Cable land-
ing sites are concentrated in a few geographic areas due to high expense and 
economies of scale.184 According to one report, there are at least ten major ca-
ble chokepoints that exist globally.185 As observed by one commentator: 
The most dangerous vulnerability is the aggregation of high-capacity bandwidth cir-
cuits into a small number of unprotected carrier hotels in which several hundred net-
work operators interconnect their circuits in one non-secure building. These buildings 
often feed directly into the international undersea cable system. Security is often far-
cical. This lack of protection exists in several carrier hotels on transit points along the 
axis of the international telecommunications system that includes Dubai, Zurich, 
Frankfurt, London, New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Tokyo, Hong Kong and 
Singapore.186 
Apart from cable landing sites, another vulnerability is the vast network of 
submarine cables on the seabed itself. Telecommunications companies “con-
centrate a large percentage of overall bandwidth in just a few major cable sys-
tems because new cable designs also incorporate tremendous capacity.”187 Ca-
bles also tend to be bundled together, “offering a potentially lucrative, consoli-
dated target for sabotage.”188 If a bundle of cables are severed all at once, it 
could result in responders having little to no chance of restoring the connection 
by rerouting the traffic to mitigate the effects of the cut.189  Due to the unpre-
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dictable ocean environment, there are obvious challenges in actually carrying 
out an attack, however, a disruption could occur as a result of something as 
simple as dropping an anchor on a cable or sending a scuba diver down to 
physically cut them (all cable routes are publicly available).190 Further, one 
scholar has pointed out the possibility of nefarious elements using an Un-
manned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) to attack cables.191 
The possibility of intentional damage to submarine cables is not as far-
fetched as it first appears. Indeed, from the Crimean War in the 1850s, the Brit-
ish were well aware of “the strategic importance of the telegraph network and 
its vulnerability to cable-cutting and other disruptions by hostile States.”192 In-
deed, the first act of the British in World War I was to cut Germany’s undersea 
telegraph cable that left Germany with just one cable, which was in any event 
under British control.193 Germany retaliated by attempting to destroy Allied 
telegraph cables in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and attacking telegraph sta-
tions and cables at Fanning Island and the Cocos Island in 1914, starting the 
notorious cables wars.194 Today, submarine cables are still legitimate targets 
during wartime (the 1884 Cable Protection Convention explicitly provides that 
obligations of protection contained in the Convention “do not in any way re-
strict the freedom of action of belligerents),195 however, submarine cables be-
tween neutral countries, even during wartime, are inviolable and can not be 
seized or destroyed except in the case of absolute necessity.196 
While there have been no large-scale attacks against cables since then, there 
have been isolated incidents of deliberate cable damage. For example, in 
March 2007, the Vietnamese military reported that a considerable amount of 
cable had been discovered on Vietnamese soil, that some vessels had been 
found with special cable cutting equipment and that cable coordinates were 
being sold illegally.197 This was followed by the discovery that 500 kilometers 
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of cable, including an 11 kilometer segment of the SEA-ME-WE 3 cable sys-
tem had been stolen.198 Local authorities had apparently permitted fishermen to 
remove old undersea cables to sell its copper, but they had helped themselves 
to the newer cables.199 This incident reportedly resulted in 82 percent of 
voice/data traffic lost, Internet delays for up to three months after thefts, and 
cost 5.8 million U.S. dollars to restore normal service.200 
In November 2007, there was a report of the intentional sabotage of a cable 
in Bangladesh, which resulted in a total loss of communications for at least one 
week causing a loss of 1.05 million U.S. dollars in revenue by the Bangladesh 
Telegraph and Telephone Board.201 In addition, there have also been reports of 
cable theft in Jamaica in 2008 where Cable and Wireless Jamaica lost 1.5 mil-
lion dollars,202 and a 2010 attack by separatists against the beach manhole con-
nection of a submarine cable system linking the Philippines with Japan.203 In 
March 2013, it was reported that 16 tons of submarine cables laid on the sea-
bed between Bangka Island and the Riau Islands in Indonesia were stolen.204  
Perhaps more disturbingly is an incident that occurred in April 2013, when 
there were interruptions on multiple undersea communications cables that link 
Europe to the Middle East and Asia including I-ME-WE, TE North, EIG and 
SEA-ME-WE 3.205 While initially chalked up to dragging ship anchors, the 
Egyptian coast guard caught three divers trying to cut the SEA-ME-WE-4 near 
Alexandria, although the motives of such an act remain unknown.206 
As grimly observed by one commentator, if attacks on cable landing sites or 
cables themselves occur: 
…these cascading failures could immobilize much of the international telecommuni-
cations systems and internet for several weeks. The effect on international finance, 
military logistics, medicine, commerce and agriculture in a global economy would be 
profound. A degraded system of military logistics would leave troops in the field with 
less support. The international flow of oil and food supplies would be impeded. Chaos 
in the shipping and airline industries would result. The system that supports e-mail, 
Word and Excel file transfers would be gone. Electronic funds transfers, credit card 
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transactions and international bank reconciliations would slow to a crawl.207 
B. Interference with Network Management Systems 
In order to drive down costs by reducing personnel and management ex-
penses, the cable industry has employed Network Management Systems 
(NMS) to remotely connect cable systems, landing stations, spare depots and 
other cable system components.208 As one scholar observed, while 
“[c]onnecting cable sites with software creates more efficiency and provides 
operators greater operational awareness…it creates potential new risk, particu-
larly to cyber attacks.”209 The worse case scenario is if hackers hack into a 
NMS, gain control of multiple cable management systems, and “attain unprec-
edented top-level views of multiple cable networks and data flows, discover 
physical cable vulnerabilities, and disrupt and divert data traffic.”210 An inci-
dent akin to this occurred in 2010, when the Stuxnet worm, a cyber weapon 
reportedly developed to target Iran nuclear facilities, disrupted the operation of 
specific plant processes that were controlled by Siemens-manufactured indus-
trial control systems.211 
C. Gaps in the Existing Law Governing the Protection of Submarine Cables 
The next question is: what role can international law play in addressing the 
above-mentioned threats to submarine communications cables? There are sev-
eral instruments in international law that could potentially be utilized, but the 
existing legal framework is fragmented and is not capable of ensuring the secu-
rity of this vital communications infrastructure. 
1. The Law of the Sea 
The natural starting point is the law of the sea, as reflected in UNCLOS. As 
previously discussed, in territorial waters, i.e. waters under the sovereignty of 
the coastal State, coastal States have the power to adopt laws to protect subma-
rine cables, even going as far as to regulate the innocent passage of foreign 
vessels through territorial waters.212 Further, UNCLOS recognizes the follow-
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ing activities are “prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the State” 
and are thus prohibited in territorial waters:213 
Any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of 
the coastal State; 
Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal State; 
Any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facili-
ties or installations of the coastal State.214 
In the event that a vessel is found to be engaging in the above activities, pas-
sage is rendered non-innocent, and coastal States can take the necessary steps 
to prevent this passage.215 Prima facie, these provisions give coastal States the 
basis to take measures to protect submarine cables from intentional damage. 
However, these provisions do not oblige States to take such measures, and 
many States do not have sufficient laws and regulations to protect cables from 
intentional damage within territorial waters, including the most basic measure 
of ensuring that damage to submarine cables is criminalized.216 
In areas outside of territorial waters, namely the EEZ and the high seas, Ar-
ticle 113 applies. To recapitulate, Article 113 of UNCLOS requires States to 
adopt laws and regulations to provide that the breaking or injury by a ship fly-
ing its flag or by a person subject to its jurisdiction of a submarine cable be-
neath the high seas done willfully or through culpable negligence is a punisha-
ble offense.217 While Article 113 could in principle cover intentional damage to 
the cable network, it has several limitations that render it ineffective at address-
ing these threats. First, many States Parties to UNCLOS have not implemented 
their obligation under Article 113 to extend criminal jurisdiction over acts 
committed on the high seas or EEZ.218 The States that have implemented Arti-
cle 113 are usually implementing their obligations under the 1884 Cable Con-
vention; meaning their legislation has not been updated and the penalties are 
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consequently woefully inadequate.219  The most common penalty in national 
legislation for intentional damage to cables is a monetary penalty,220 which is 
arguably not commensurate with the damage resulting from intentional inter-
ference with cable systems. 
Second, jurisdiction under Article 113 is limited to perpetrators who are na-
tionals of that State, or if they use a vessel flying the flag of that State.221 Given 
the critical nature of submarine communications cables there is a strong argu-
ment that intentional damage is a crime that attracts universal jurisdiction and 
that all States should have jurisdiction over the offender. At the very least, the 
State(s) whose communications have been disrupted should have jurisdiction 
to prosecute as well as the State on whose continental shelf the damaged cable 
is located.222 
Third, Article 113 only obliges States to adopt laws criminalizing intentional 
damage, and neither gives warships the right to board, nor arrest a vessel sus-
pected of intentionally breaking a cable.223 Generally speaking, due to concerns 
about unnecessary interference with the freedom of navigation, the right to 
board vessels in areas outside the territorial sea (i.e. EEZ/high seas) is highly 
regulated under UNCLOS and is only allowed in certain instances.224 States 
have opposed a right to board without the consent of the flag states even for the 
suppression of the most serious crimes.225 However, there is some merit in the 
argument that warships of all States should have the right to board vessels sus-
pected of intentionally breaking a cable. For example, Article X of the 1884 
Cable Convention allows warships to require the master of a vessel suspected 
of having broken a cable to provide documentation to show the ship’s national-
ity and thereafter to make a report to the flag state.226 This provides an effective 
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deterrent to prospective attacks. 
Some scholars have argued that intentional damage to cables could fall with-
in the definition of piracy under UNCLOS.227 Article 101 defines piracy as, 
“any illegal acts of violence or detention or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship, or a private 
aircraft, and directed . . . on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft . . . against a ship, 
aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”228 
The advantage of deeming intentional damage to cables as a piratical act is that 
it would be subject to universal jurisdiction and gives all warships the right to 
board and arrest a suspected vessel.229 However, it would certainly be a 
strained interpretation due to the requirement under the definition of piracy that 
two vessels be involved, and that it be done for private ends/commercial pur-
poses.230 
Fourth, UNCLOS only applies to the portion of cable that is laid on the sea-
bed and does not apply to attacks against cable landing sites.231 
2. The Law of Cyberattack 
There is no accepted definition of what constitutes a “cyberattack,” and in-
deed this term has been used interchangeably with cyber-warfare and cyber-
crime.232 The U.S. Department of Defense’s Dictionary of Military Terms de-
fines “computer network attack” (“CNA”) as “actions taken through the use of 
computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in 
computers and computer networks or the computers and networks them-
selves.”233 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) also adopts this 
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definition but adds that “a computer network attack is a type of cyber at-
tack.”234 The Joint Chiefs of Staff have defined network warfare as: 
[T]he employment of Computer Network Operations (CNO) with the intent of deny-
ing adversaries the effective use of their computers, information systems, and net-
works, while ensuring the effective use of our own computers, information systems, 
and networks. These operations include Computer Network Attack (CNA), Computer 
Network Exploration (CNE) and Computer Network Defense (CND).235 
The U.S. National Research Council defines cyber-attacks as “deliberate ac-
tions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade or destroy computer systems or net-
works or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these sys-
tems or networks.”236 Some suggest an objective-based definition of cyberat-
tack: “[a] cyber-attack consists of any action taken to undermine the functions 
of a computer network for a political or national security purpose.”237 
Under any of the above definitions, an intentional attack on submarine ca-
bles laid on the seabed, on cable landing sites, and on the network management 
systems that operate cable systems, would constitute a cyber-attack.238 The next 
question is whether international law applies to cyber-attacks and if it does, 
does it provide an effective framework that protects the security of submarine 
cables. 
There has been much debate on whether and to what extent international law 
applies to cyber- attacks. After all, unlike traditional battle domains: 
[C]yberspace is the only domain which is entirely man-made. It is created, main-
tained, owned and operated collectively by public and private stakeholders across the 
globe and changes constantly in response to technological innovation. Cyberspace not 
being subject to geopolitical or natural boundaries, information and electronic pay-
loads are deployed instantaneously between any point of origin and any destination 
connected through the electromagnetic spectrum . . . While cyberspace is readily ac-
cessible to governments, non-state organizations, private enterprises and individuals 
alike, IP spoofing and the use of botnets, for example, make it easy to disguise the 
origin of an operation, thus rendering the reliable identification and attribution of 
cyber activities particularly difficult.239 
This highlights one of the central difficulties in developing an adequate legal 
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framework to govern a cyber-attack that has challenged international law, 
namely the fact “the speed and anonymity of cyberattacks makes proving State 
responsibility and ‘distinguishing among the actions of terrorists, criminals and 
nation states difficult.’”240 
Experts and scholars alike have struggled with what international law ap-
plies to cyberattacks. For example, from its inception in 2004, the United Na-
tions’ Governmental Group of Experts (“GGE”) on Developments in the Field 
of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Securi-
ty debated over whether international law applied to the use of information and 
communication technologies by States.241 In particular, there was disagreement 
on whether the laws of war, namely jus ad bellum (when it is appropriate to go 
to war) and jus in bello (principles governing the way in which war is conduct-
ed) applied to cyberattacks.242 That said, in September 2012, the U.S. Depart-
ment of State Legal Advisor, Harold Koh, confidently asserted that established 
principles of the international laws of war apply to cyberspace.243 In June 2013, 
the GGE stated, “[i]nternational law, and in particular the Charter of the United 
Nations, is applicable, and is essential in maintaining peace and stability and 
promoting an open, secure and peaceful and accessible ICT environment.”244 
While there is no doubt that certain bodies of international law can be used to 
deal with cyber-attacks, it is piecemeal and fragmented, and by no means com-
prehensively addresses the security challenges posed by cyber-attacks.245 
In the context of intentional damage to submarine cables, cable landing sites 
and interference with network management systems, which involve both phys-
ical infrastructure and virtual space, the laws of war can fill some of the gaps. 
Jus ad bellum determines when the use of force is justified.246 As a starting 
point, Article 2 ¶ 4 of the U.N. Charter provides that Member States “shall re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other man-
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ner inconsistent with the [p]urposes of the United Nations.”247 This is rein-
forced by the customary international law principle of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of States.248 There are two exceptions to the prohibition on the 
use of force. Article 39 of the Charter allows the Security Council to authorize 
collective security operations in response to threats to the peace, breach of 
peace or an act of aggression.249 Article 51 provides that States have the inher-
ent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs.250 
Thus, in the event that intentional interference with submarine cable systems 
amount to a “threat to international peace and security or an act of aggres-
sion,”251 (as determined by the Security Council), the Security Council can au-
thorize a use of force against that State. Similarly, if intentional interference 
with submarine cable systems amounts to an “armed attack,”252 a State or 
States have the right of self-defense. 
While this is of course important, these principles do not effectively address 
the protection of this critical communications infrastructure. First, such attacks 
would have to amount to a “threat to international peace and security” or an 
“armed attack” before the Security Council and/or States can take action.253 
This may prove to be particularly difficult for intentional infiltration against 
the network management systems of submarine cables, in which there may be 
no physical manifestation. Second, it assumes that the perpetrators of such at-
tacks are easily identifiable, and does not address intentional damage to cable 
systems committed by non-State actors. Third, a State’s use of force in re-
sponse to an armed attack in the form of intentional interference with cable 
systems must also comply with jus ad bellum principles of necessity and pro-
portionality under customary international law.254 Necessity requires that force 
must only be used as a last resort when diplomatic means fail and proportional-
ity requires that responses cannot be excessive. This circumscribes the re-
sponse that States can take. “[C]yber-attacks rising to the level of armed at-
tacks may require decision-makers to devise ways of measuring harm to com-
puter networks and its indirect effects against more conventional kinds of harm 
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in order to determine what would constitute a lawful response.”255 
Apart from the laws of war, international telecommunications law may also 
address cyberattacks, including intentional damage to cable systems. The ITU 
is the leading U.N. agency that establishes international standards for infor-
mation and communication technology.256 The organization is primarily con-
cerned with allocating global radio spectrum and satellite orbits, and develop-
ing technical standards to ensure that networks and technologies seamlessly 
interconnect.257 The ITU has issued some regulations and standards that could 
apply to cyber-attacks which make use of electromagnetic spectrum or interna-
tional telecommunications networks, but none of these directly implicate the 
protection of cables systems from intentional damage.258 
3. Terrorism Conventions 
There are existing counter-terrorism conventions that could apply to inten-
tional attacking cable systems. For example, the International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings adopted in 1997 provides that it is an 
offense to unlawfully and intentionally use an explosive or lethal device 
against an infrastructure facility with the intent to cause extensive destruction 
of such facility or where such destruction results in or likely to result in major 
economic loss.259 An “infrastructure facility” is defined as “any publicly or pri-
vately owned facility providing or distributing services for the benefit of the 
public such as water, sewage, energy, fuel or communications.”260 However, 
this is restricted in its effectiveness as it would only apply to cable landing 
sites destroyed as a result of bombing and not necessarily to actual cables de-
stroyed by another method. It would also not apply to attacks on the NMS of 
cable facilities. 
D. The Way Forward: An International Treaty 
The above discussion amply illustrates that presently that while there is a 
patchwork of international laws that could theoretically address certain aspects 
of the security of cable systems, there are significant gaps. Given the potential 
severe ramifications of intentional damage to global economy and security, as 
well as the complexity of regulating something that inherently transnational in 
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nature, international cooperation between States in the form of an international 
multilateral treaty on the protection of submarine cable systems appears to be 
the best way forward. 
This would no doubt be a complex endeavor in view of the fact that protect-
ing a submarine cable system involves the virtual, land, and sea domains, and 
consequently, a cross-section of international and national agencies as well as a 
variety of experts from different fields. However, as will be illustrated below, a 
useful starting point is to use the structure of the terrorism conventions.261 
First, the international treaty should define a range of offenses which would 
include intentional damage to cable landing sites, land cables and submarine 
cables provided that they are part a submarine cable system. Moreover, it 
should also include the offense of using malware to take control of network 
management systems for the purpose of disrupting communications. 
Second, the treaty should oblige State Parties to ensure that these offenses 
are reflected in national legislation punishable with commensurate penalties. 
Third, States Parties should also be required to establish jurisdiction over the 
offenses defined in the convention when they have a link or connection to the 
offense because the act took place within their territory, or was committed by 
their national, or from a ship flying their flag.262 
Fourth, State Parties should also be required to establish jurisdiction over 
the offense when the alleged offender is “present in their territory” and the 
State chooses not to extradite them. This requires States to enact legislation 
which give their courts jurisdiction to try the offender, even though the offense 
was committed by a foreign national outside their territory, so long as the of-
fender is physically present in their territory.263 
Fifth, if the alleged offender is present in their territory, State parties should 
have a legal obligation to take them into custody and to ensure their presence 
in their territory. The State then has only two choices: it must either extradite 
the alleged offender or prosecute them. The State can extradite the alleged of-
fender to another State party that has jurisdiction, such as the State of nation-
ality of the offender, the State in whose territory the offense was committed, or 
the State on whose ship the offense was committed. If they elect not to extra-
dite the alleged offender, the State’s only option is to prosecute the offender in 
their courts.264 
Sixth, the convention should include provisions that make it possible to ex-
tradite alleged offenders to other State parties, even in the absence of an extra-
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dition treaty between the two countries.265 
Seventh, the convention should contain provisions that require State parties 
to provide mutual legal assistance to assist the State where the alleged offend-
ers are prosecuted. The legal assistance would include matters such as provid-
ing evidence or witnesses.266 
The first question is whether States have the necessary political will to nego-
tiate such a convention. Indeed, it is surprising that such a treaty has not been 
negotiated as yet given the critical importance of submarine cables and how 
other conventions have been adopted for airport and maritime infrastructure.267 
There are several possible reasons for this. First, there is a lack of awareness 
about the importance of cables to the international telecommunications system. 
Evidence about the lack of awareness is highlighted by the common miscon-
ception that the Internet and other web-based technologies are provided by 
satellite. 
Second, unlike other public infrastructure that has received protection under 
international treaties, the cable industry has been driven by private investment 
and companies.268 Governments have very little involvement in the construc-
tion and management of cables, and have thus always perceived cable systems 
as a problem for the private sector.269 
Third, there is also no international intergovernmental organization respon-
sible for submarine cables and thus nobody is advocating for its protection on 
the international level.270 The ITU, as mentioned above, would seem the most 
relevant agency but is unaware about the marine portion of submarine cables. 
The ICPC is an industry based organization representing the industry although 
it recently began to admit States as members.271 
In this regard, the best forum to raise the protection of submarine cables 
would appear to be the United Nations efforts to address cyber security con-
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cerns. There have been two GGEs that have examined the existing and poten-
tial threats from the cyber-sphere, first in 2004 and second in 2009.272 The Re-
port of the 2009/2010 recommended, amongst other things, dialogue on norms 
for State use of information and communications technologies to reduce risk 
and protect critical infrastructure.273 Indeed, in its most recent Report issued in 
2015, it has been reported that the GGE has adopted several norms that include 
understandings that nations should not intentionally damage each other’s criti-
cal infrastructure with cyber attacks; should not target each other’s cyber 
emergency responders; and should assist other nations investigating cyberat-
tacks and cybercrimes launched from their territories.274 While it is not clear 
whether the protection of submarine cable systems has come up during discus-
sions, it certainly provides an appropriate platform to discuss such issues. 
IV. SUBMARINE CABLES: A TOOL FOR INTELLIGENCE-
GATHERING? 
 Frequently described as the second oldest profession,275 espionage has 
existed since time immemorial, leading Hugo Grotius to write in the 17th Cen-
tury that “there is no doubt, but the law of nations allows anyone to send spies, 
as Moses did to the land of promise, of whom Joshua was one.”276 The concept 
of peacetime espionage or intelligence gathering “encompasses a wide range of 
clandestine government activities”277 with the objective of ensuring that “as 
much as possible is known in advance of any particular course of action being 
taken.”278 Arguably, intelligence gathering is one of the lesser-known uses of 
the submarine cable network.279 While the practice remains unsurprisingly 
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shrouded in mystery, there appear to be two ways in which submarine cables 
have been used for intelligence gathering purposes, first by placing a recording 
device on undersea cables (hereinafter referred to as “underwater surveil-
lance”) and the tapping of undersea cables for purposes of collecting the data 
that passes through them.280 Each will be dealt with in detail below. 
A. Underwater Surveillance 
A vital component of maritime security is ensuring that States have all the 
available information at their disposal to take preventative or responsive ac-
tion.281 As observed by Klein: 
[I]ntelligence gathering at sea has predominantly concerned the pursuit of information 
that may prove useful for a state’s national security. In other words, what does a state 
need to know about the maritime areas of another state, or what may otherwise be 
learned about a state (including its defensive or aggressive capacity) from the water 
surrounding it? This intelligence enables states to make decisions about their own na-
tional defence.282 
The United States has described intelligence gathering in ocean spaces as 
Maritime Domain Awareness (“MDA”), which is “the effective understanding 
of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the securi-
ty, safety, economy or environment of the United States,”283 in order to “facili-
tate timely, accurate decision-making so as to enable actions that neutralize 
threats to US national security interests.”284 Maritime intelligence collection 
really began to gain traction in World War II where maritime signal intelli-
gence gathering (“SIGINT”) and maritime electronic intelligence gathering 
(“ELINT”) were developed and employed.285 Ships were increasingly seen as 
“modern intelligence-gathering platforms” tasked with gathering communica-
tions and electronic intelligence.286 There now exist a plethora of technologies 
that are utilized for maritime intelligence gathering, including “radar, sonar 
and laser technologies; electro-optical, oceanographic, hydrographic, acoustic, 
geophysical and geospatial sensing; satellite spot-beam and microwave relay 
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traffic interception systems; airborne and ship-based maritime communication 
surveillance, and electronic warfare (“EW”) capabilities; and more recently, 
long-endurance reconnaissance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (“UAVs”).”287 
Submarine coaxial cables, now just submarine cables, also provided an op-
portunity for maritime intelligence gathering. In the late 1950s, the Office of 
Naval Research funded the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(“AT&T”) to develop an undersea surveillance system designed to detect and 
track Soviet submarines.288 By “setting up multiple listening posts – arrays of 
hydrophones strung along lengths of cabling – at strategic choke points like the 
GIUK gap, the U.S. Navy would be able to triangulate and track the locations 
of otherwise deep-diving Soviet subs.”289 This system was known as Sound 
Surveillance System (“SOSUS”) and was viewed as “a key, long-range early 
warning asset for protecting the United States against the threat of Soviet bal-
listic missile submarines…and also provided vital cueing information for tacti-
cal, deep-ocean anti-submarine warfare.290 The hydrophones were connected 
by cables to processing centers located on shore known as Naval Facilities.291 
At the height of the Cold War in the 1970s, the U.S. Government launched 
Operation Ivy Bells, which involved deploying submarines and combat divers 
to place waterproof hydrophones on the undersea cable that ran parallel to the 
Kuril Islands off Russia.292 SOSUS was eventually supplemented by surface-
based listening posts and subsequently integrated into the larger Integrated 
Undersea Surveillance System (“IUSS”).293 The Russians discovered the pro-
ject in 1981 when NSA employee Ronald Pelton sold information about the 
program to the KGB for $35,000.294 They then began to develop quieter sub-
marines and by the end of the Cold War, the ability of IUSS to detect and track 
Soviet nuclear submarines had considerably diminished,295 and the end of the 
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Cold War reduced the necessity for such a system.296 That said, it has been re-
ported that “growing concerns of China’s rising naval power and Russia’s re-
newed aggression have the Navy’s Space and Naval Warfare Systems Com-
mand (SPAWAR) propositioning to commercial ventures and defense contrac-
tors alike for a new generation of deep water listening stations.”297 While the 
initial SOSUS used submarine cables specifically constructed for intelligence 
gathering, it is not clear whether a new generation of underwater listening sta-
tions would use the existing submarine fiber optic network. The latter possibil-
ity appears to be more unlikely, given the industry’s concern with preserving 
the integrity of global telecommunications.298 Moreover, the military would 
likely own and operate an underwater listening system using its own submarine 
cable network, rather than commercially owned ones. 
SOSUS provided the foundation for cables to be used by scientists for ma-
rine data collection. During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy permitted a small 
number of oceanographers to make use of the SOSUS system for research.299 
The Navy’s action fueled further research into how submarine cables could be 
used for scientific purposes, and as mentioned above, submarine cables are 
now used for deep-ocean monitoring.300 This involves equipping submarine 
communications with scientific sensors for climate monitoring and disaster 
reduction.301 These scientific sensors would collect key measurements relevant 
to climate change and disaster detection such as temperature, pressure, salini-
ty/conductivity, seismic, hydroacoustic, and cable voltage.302 The scientific 
sensors are placed within the repeaters found on submarine cables every 60 to 
100 kilometers.303 There are three ways in which submarine cables can be inte-
grated into real-time global climate and disaster monitoring systems. First, by 
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re-using out of service cables.304 Second, another suggestion has been to attach 
sensors and related components to in-service communications cables.305 The 
third option is the development of a new generation of multi-purpose cables.306 
This would entail redesigning the repeaters that are integrated with built-in 
sensors that would enable climate monitoring and disaster detection.307 
B. UNCLOS 
Before addressing the applicable provisions in UNCLOS in detail, a few sa-
lient points should be mentioned. First, except for one provision in Part II on 
the territorial sea,308 intelligence gathering is not explicitly mentioned in UN-
CLOS. It only occasionally came up in during the negotiations of UNCLOS as 
part of a larger debate on the permissibility of military activities309 in the 
oceans and was never the object of formal negotiations310 due to the belief of 
many States, that this would rapidly derail any efforts to come to an agreement 
on a convention.311 However, the issue of military activities including intelli-
gence gathering was always hovering in the background and shaped the way in 
which many of the provisions were drafted, particularly in the EEZ.312 After all, 
the maritime powers wanted to preserve their ability to move freely around the 
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oceans and to defend national security interests.313 Coastal States, on the other 
hand, were naturally wary of the navies of third States operating in areas near 
their coasts and perceived such activities as prejudicial to their national securi-
ty.314 Ultimately, the Convention is largely silent on this issue, and as will be 
demonstrated below, this has resulted in a considerable amount of uncertainty 
and ambiguity on whether intelligence gathering is permitted under UNCLOS. 
The next three sections will discuss the UNCLOS regime on intelligence 
gathering in three major maritime zones, the territorial sea, the EEZ and the 
high seas, and how it relates to the construction of an underwater listening sta-
tion either by laying new cables on the seabed specifically for this purpose or 
by placing recording devices on an existing cable telecommunications net-
work. 
1. Territorial Seas 
Within the territorial sea, the coastal state controls and authorizes the laying 
of cables and any activity associated with it.315 Further, it is very clear that any 
intelligence gathering by third States is prohibited. As noted in Part II, the ter-
ritorial sea is a zone in which the coastal State has sovereignty, and this is only 
constrained by the coastal State’s obligation to allow foreign flagged vessels 
innocent passage.316 Passage is innocent provided it is not prejudicial to the 
peace, good order, or security of the coastal State.317 Research and survey ac-
tivities “are any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the de-
fense or security of the coastal State,” and “any act aimed at interfering with 
any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of the 
coastal State,” and “any activity not having a direct bearing on passage” will 
render passage non-innocent.318  Clearly, the establishment of underwater lis-
tening stations using cables would fall foul of the above prohibitions.319 
2. Exclusive Economic Zone 
As mentioned above, the EEZ is neither under the sovereignty of the coastal 
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State nor part of the high seas, but is a special sui generis regime320 where the 
coastal State has rights and jurisdiction over resources and certain other activi-
ties321 to be balanced with the traditional high seas freedoms afforded to other 
States.322 
There are several arguments both for and against the legality of using sub-
marine cables for intelligence gathering, many of which are part of the larger 
debate between States such as the United States and China on the legality of 
military activities generally.323 The academic discourse on the legality of mili-
tary activities generally, which can be somewhat polemic, is vast and not pos-
sible to comprehensively canvas in this Article. The discussion that follows 
will attempt to synthesize some of this literature and apply it to the specific 
example of using cables for intelligence gathering. 
The first issue that arises is whether submarine cables used for underwater 
surveillance falls within one of the rights of all States recognized in the EEZ 
under Article 58 (1): 
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, sub-
ject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in arti-
cle 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipe-
lines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such 
as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and 
pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.324 
All States have the right to lay cables in the EEZ.325 In the majority of the 
relevant provisions in UNCLOS, the generic phrase “submarine cable” is used 
and the term is not defined anywhere in UNCLOS. It has been argued that “the 
objective, purpose and interpretation of this term—”submarine cables”—and 
subsequent agreements strongly suggest that the term refers to cables used to 
transport voice, data and internet traffic between system end points.”326 Thus, it 
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has been contended that the laying of hydrophone arrays in the EEZ using ca-
bles can be subsumed under the freedom to lay cables since their “key func-
tions of transmitting electronic impulses and information to terminals or other 
receivers have common elements.”327 Roach has also argued that military ca-
bles, which are submarine cables used for military purposes or are military 
owned and/or leased, are subject to the same regime under international law 
that governs submarine cables.328 
It could also be argued cables used for underwater surveillance cannot be 
subsumed under the freedom to lay cables because the objectives of such ca-
bles is not the transmission of data or telecommunications but rather covert 
intelligence gathering.329 Accordingly, the next question is whether it can be 
considered part of “other internationally lawful use of the sea related to these 
freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of… submarine ca-
bles.” 330 The answer to this hinges on whether intelligence gathering is permit-
ted in the EEZ, an issue which is mired in controversy.331 According to the 
United States, this phrase was an implicit reference to traditional high seas 
freedoms such as the freedom to conduct a large range of military activities, 
including intelligence gathering activities and consequently using cables for 
underwater surveillance.332 Preserving traditional high seas freedoms of mili-
tary activities in the EEZ was a high priority for the US333 and thus U.S. Am-
bassador Elliot Richardson proposed the language of “internationally lawful 
uses of the sea” to preserve such freedoms.334 According to the United States, 
the treaty negotiations support this interpretation.335 The maritime powers were 
willing to concede to the coastal States economic rights over a vast portion of 
the oceans provided that traditional high seas freedoms such as military activi-
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ties were preserved in this zone.336 As the nomenclature suggests, the “concept 
of an [EEZ] was not intended to reserve any rights for coastal States other than 
the economic rights of the coastal State in those waters, as well as a narrow 
slice of associated jurisdiction for specific purposes.”337 Attempts during nego-
tiations to recognize the security interests of the coastal State in the EEZ were 
explicitly rejected.338 Thus, any aerial, surface, and subsurface surveillance 
activities in the EEZ is an “internationally lawful use of the sea” that has been 
borne out by State practice.339 Relative to this interpretation, the laying of ca-
bles with recording devices and the placement of recording devices on existing 
cable networks are lawful intelligence gathering activities; however, there are 
several counter-arguments to this, some of which raise legitimate legal argu-
ments. 
First, the plain reading of “internationally lawful uses of the sea” only rec-
ognize that all vessels, including military vessels, enjoy freedom of navigation 
within the EEZ.340 The language does not give States unrestricted rights to con-
duct military activities in the EEZ.341 Further, in contrast to the position put 
forth by the United States, there was not a clear and unanimous understanding 
that military activities would not be prohibited in the EEZ.342 Several States 
rejected such an interpretation, even at the time of adoption of the Convention. 
For example, Brazil stated on the signing of the Convention that the “provi-
sions of the Convention do not authorize other States to carry out military ex-
ercises or maneuvers, within the exclusive economic zone, particularly when 
these activities involve the use of weapons or explosives.343 Indeed, it is true 
that the issue was not formally raised in negotiations and therefore, it can be 
said that there was no agreement on the issue. Further, it is also argued that 
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there is no consistent State practice on this issue, and indeed, several States 
have adopted EEZ legislation that recognize security-related interests in the 
EEZ.344 While such legislation may be prima facie a violation of UNCLOS, it 
certainly demonstrates a lack of consensus on the permissibility of intelligence 
gathering in the EEZ.345 
Second, it has also been suggested by some Chinese academics that intelli-
gence gathering activities are contrary to the obligation of reserving the EEZ 
for peaceful purposes346 and the overarching obligation in Article 301 of UN-
CLOS requiring all States to refrain from any threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other man-
ner inconsistent with the principle of international law embodied in the UN 
Charter.347 Not all military activities/intelligence gathering activities are contra-
ry to the peaceful purposes obligation, only those that threaten or use force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state inconsistent 
with the UN Charter.348 The question then becomes what constitutes a threat or 
use of force inconsistent with the Charter. Some intelligence gathering tech-
nologies used in the EEZ are becoming “increasingly more intensive and intru-
sive,”349 this includes: 
[A]ctive signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities conducted from aircraft and ships, 
some of which are deliberately provocative and intended to generate programmed re-
sponses. Other SIGINT activities intercept naval radar and emitters, thus enabling the 
location, identification and tracking of surface ships as well as the planning and prepa-
ration of electronic missiles against them. These activities appear to involve far great-
er interference with the communication and defense systems of the targeted coastal 
State than any traditional passive intelligence gathering activities conducted from out-
side national territory.350 
Notwithstanding the above, the threshold for an intelligence gathering ac-
tivity reaching the threshold of a use of force or threat of use of force is high, 
and underwater surveillance by cables does not meet this threshold.351 
Fourth, it has also been argued that a user State’s obligation to have due re-
gard for the rights and duties of the coastal State, and to comply with the laws 
and regulations adopted by the coastal State under Article 58 (3) of UNCLOS 
is a restraint on military activities in the EEZ.352 China, for example, has sug-
gested that the due regard obligation requires States to refrain from any activi-
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ties “which endanger the sovereignty, security and national interests of the 
coastal countries.”353 Due regard has not been defined by the Convention; how-
ever, it is considered a procedural obligation which involves a balancing of the 
rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State and user States in the EEZ.354 
It is said to consist of two elements, an awareness of and consideration for oth-
er State’s interests and a weighing of those interests or sources of authority.355 
In the present case, the due regard obligation does not prohibit military activi-
ties, as it merely mandates that it does not interfere with the coastal State’s 
economic rights over resources, and its jurisdiction over the environment, ma-
rine scientific research and installations. Moreover, from a practical perspec-
tive, it is difficult to see how the due regard obligation would be implemented 
for military reconnaissance activities. For example, as has been argued else-
where, for military activities like weapons exercises, the due regard obligation 
can be implemented through a system of notification. Intelligence gathering is 
inherently covert and thus a system of notifications would not work. Thus, the 
due regard obligation provides a weak, if any, limit on intelligence gathering 
activities. 
Fifth, instead of being an “internationally lawful use of the sea associated 
with the operation of ships, aircraft, and submarine cables,”356 it has been ar-
gued that cables used for underwater surveillance fall within “artificial islands, 
installations and structures”357 under the jurisdiction of the coastal State pursu-
ant to Article 60 of UNCLOS. Article 60 stipulates that the coastal State has 
the “exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, 
operation and use of (a) artificial islands; (b) installations and structures for the 
purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic purposes; (c) installa-
tions and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the 
coastal State in the zone.”358 There are several problems with this argument. A 
submarine cable is not easily classified as an installation or structure.359 Fur-
ther, Article 60 also clearly sets out with some specificity the artificial islands, 
installations, and structures which the coastal State has jurisdiction over those 
which are used for economic purposes, marine scientific research or environ-
mental purposes, as set out in Article 56, and those which interfere with the 
rights of the coastal State in the EEZ as recognized under UNCLOS. Proposals 
to give the coastal State the exclusive right to construct and regulate all artifi-
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cial islands, installations and structures for any purpose, including military 
installation and devices were rejected, which suggests that the coastal State 
right was intended to be circumscribed, and thus does not apply to military 
installations. 
3. High Seas 
Customary international law has always recognized military activities in-
cluding intelligence gathering has a lawful use of the high seas associated with 
the operation of warships exercising the freedom of navigation.360  The list of 
high seas freedoms set forth in Article 87 of UNCLOS was not intended to be 
an exhaustive list,361 and although not explicitly mentioned in Article 87 of 
UNCLOS, it is generally agreed that intelligence gathering is a high seas free-
dom.362 
As mentioned above, the laying of cables is also a high seas freedom,363 and 
thus, prima facie, a country’s military forces would be free to lay cables with 
underwater listening stations used specifically for military purposes pursuant to 
this right. 
C. Tapping of Undersea Fiber Cables 
Historically, the U.S. National Security Agency conducted its covert intelli-
gence gathering activities using satellite and microwave towers but this was 
considerably hindered with the increasing use of submarine cables for the 
transmission of communications.364 The pinnacle of these tapping endeavors is 
certainly the discovery in 2013 that both the United States and United King-
dom national security agencies have been “tapping directly into the Internet’s 
backbone,”365 namely the fiber optic cables. According to newspapers reports, 
the existence of these programs was disclosed by the NSA whistleblower Ed-
ward Snowden as part of his efforts to expose “the largest programme of suspi-
cionless surveillance in human history.”366 The UK’s fiber tapping program 
known as Tempora was able to collect around 21 million gigabytes per day, 
including “recordings of phone calls, the content of e-mail messages, entries on 
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Facebook and the history of any internet user’s access to websites- all of which 
is deemed legal, even though the warrant system was supposed to limit inter-
ception to a specified range of targets.”367 Hundreds of analysts from both the 
GCHQ and NSA sifted through the data that was obtained from more than 200 
fiber optic cables.368 This has been described as “upstream collection,” which 
involves the accessing of communications of fiber cables and infrastructure as 
data flows past.369 The data “provides a powerful tool in the hands of the secu-
rity agencies enabling them to sift for evidence of serious crime…it has al-
lowed them to discover new techniques used by terrorists to avoid security 
checks[,]…identify terrorists planning atrocities[, and]…used against child 
exploitation networks and in the field of cyberdefence.”370 
At least seven telecommunications companies have been allegedly complicit 
in this project.371 Indeed, it has been alleged that some companies have been 
paid for the cost of their cooperation and/or were obliged to co-operate as a 
condition of their licensing.372 How these agencies might tap an underwater 
cable is not entirely clear as the process is extremely secretive. One report has 
stated that intercept probes are attached to transatlantic fiber-optic cables 
where they land at cable landing stations located on British shores.373 
Other reports speculate that it is done by directly tapping undersea cables 
that are laid on the seabed. In the mid-1990s, it was reported that the NSA in-
stalled a tap onto an undersea cable by using a special submarine to splice into 
the cable, although details are vague.374 Similarly, in 2005, it was reported that 
the submarine USS Jimmy Carter was equipped with the ability to tap undersea 
cables and eavesdrop on the communications passing through them.375 Such an 
operation involves the submarine lifting the cable from the seabed and onto the 
submarine into a special chamber where crew would extract data either by 
bending the fiber or by splicing a second fiber to each of the fibers. 376 Accord-
ing to one article “the easiest place to get into the cables is at the regeneration 
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points—spots where their signals are amplified and pushed forward on their 
long circuitous journeys.”377 Such physical tapping is necessary when cable-
landing stations are on foreign soil and are otherwise inaccessible.378 However, 
in 2001 cable experts expressed doubt that physical tapping could occur, con-
sidering that splicing a fiber could result in an interruption in communications 
which could be detected by the cable operator.379 
At this point, it is appropriate to highlight the distinction in objectives be-
tween cables used for the Sound Surveillance System described above, and the 
tapping of cables. The former is done in order to enhance awareness about the 
environment in which navies operate, including gathering information on the 
military capabilities of the Soviet Union.380 The latter is a form of mass surveil-
lance or bulk electronic surveillance that has been described as the “clandestine 
surveillance by one state during peacetime of the communications of another’s 
state’s officials or citizens when those communications take place partly or 
entirely outside the surveilling state’s territory.”381 
Whether UNCLOS can be used to address the mass surveillance carried out 
through the tapping of undersea cables is not entirely clear. To the extent that 
UNCLOS governs intelligence gathering activities, it could be argued that it 
only applies to intelligence gathering activities that take place within the mari-
time domain, and will not govern the use of intercepts at cable landing stations. 
Further, if indeed mass surveillance can be done by physically tapping under-
sea cables by splicing the cable or otherwise, it is also not certain that UN-
CLOS is the applicable regime to govern such acts. Such surveillance does not 
fall within conventional perceptions of military activities/intelligence gathering 
at sea, which as mentioned above, is targeted, and aims at enhancing 
knowledge of the marine environment and/or the military capabilities of other 
State’s navies. That said, UNCLOS is of course a living instrument and subject 
to evolutionary interpretation, and for present purposes, this Article will as-
sume that UNCLOS applies to the mass surveillance carried out by tapping 
undersea cables to the extent it involves physically tapping cables as they lay 
on the seabed. 
Within the territorial sea, as was the case for cables used for underwater sur-
veillance discussed above, the physical tapping of submarine cables will cer-
tainly be deemed as an “act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of 
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the defence or security of the coastal State,”382 or an “act aimed at interfering 
with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of 
the coastal State,”383 and will thus render passage non-innocent.384 
Within the EEZ, the discussion above on the controversy surrounding the 
legality of intelligence gathering activities would also apply—the bottom line 
is that there is no clear prohibition against the physical tapping of fiber optic 
cables in the EEZ to be found in UNCLOS. However, if the physical tapping 
of fiber optic cables results in the interruption or obstruction of telecommuni-
cations, then Article 113 may come into play. Article 113 obliges State Parties 
to ensure that there is adequate national legislation penalizing the willful or 
negligent breakage or injury to a submarine cable that results in obstruction or 
interruption of telecommunications. In particular, if physical tapping involves 
splicing a cable which does cause a disruption of communications, this would 
be a breach of Article 113.385 That said, Article 113 may not be particularly 
useful, considering that many States have not implemented their obligation 
under Article 113 to adopt national legislation. Further, physical taps may also 
be hard to detect although they reportedly can cause a slow-down in communi-
cations. In the high seas, intelligence gathering is a freedom of the high seas; 
however, if physical tapping results in breakage/injury to the cable so as to 
disrupt telecommunications, Article 113 applies. 
D. The Way Forward 
The legal regime established in UNCLOS has significant gaps in relation to 
intelligence gathering in maritime areas. This is arguably unsurprising given 
that “traditional international law is remarkably oblivious to the peacetime 
practice of espionage.”386 As observed by Chesterman: 
Despite its relative importance in the conduct of international affairs, there are few 
treaties that deal with it directly. Academic literature typically omits the subject en-
tirely, or includes a paragraph or two defining espionage and describing the unhappy 
fate of captured spies. For the most part, only special regimes such as the laws of war 
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address intelligence explicitly. Beyond this, it looms large but almost silently in the 
legal regimes dealing with diplomatic protection and arms control.387 
Deeks postulates that there are three approaches to international law’s regu-
lation of intelligence gathering.388 The first approach contends that because 
there is nothing in international law that prohibits espionage, it is permitted 
under international law.389 The second approach argues that “international law 
should be read affirmatively to permit spying” as it is inherent in a State’s right 
to act in self-defense and/or it has been affirmed by widespread state prac-
tice.390 The third approach proposes that international law does regulate intelli-
gence gathering, drawing from three sources of law, namely the law on sover-
eignty and territorial integrity, human rights law such as the International Con-
vention on Civil and Political Rights and the Vienna Convention on Diplomat-
ic Relations, although “those sources lack crisp content or have not been con-
sistently read by states to inhibit foreign surveillance.”391 The lack of clarity on 
when and the extent to which international law applies to espionage has meant 
that domestic law governs much espionage activity.392 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to put forth comprehensive solutions to 
the legal issues related to intelligence gathering in the oceans.393 Nonetheless, a 
few salient points are worth mentioning. While it is possible that States will 
negotiate a treaty to regulate intelligence gathering in general, it is arguably a 
far-off possibility given the wide divergence of opinions on its legality.394 Oth-
er scholars have put forth suggestions on what an international legal frame-
work could look like and these provide extremely useful foundations for a dia-
logue on this issue. Regardless of whether international law can provide a solu-
tion, a wider question needs to be asked—should submarine cables be used for 
intelligence gathering activities at all? The mass surveillance done by physical-
ly tapping cables underwater (to the extent that it is done) would appear to run 
the risk of damaging the cable and thus putting the submarine cable network in 
jeopardy. While there is less of a chance of cables being damaged when they 
are used for acoustic surveillance underwater, such uses of submarine cables 
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increases the suspicion and mistrust on the part of States to cable laying activi-
ty. Coastal States are increasingly imposing regulations on cable laying and 
repair in the EEZ undermining its status as one of the freedoms recognized 
there.395 While this is unsurprising given that coastal States view the EEZ in 
quasi-territorial terms and wish to control all activities which take place there, 
the perception cables can be used for such military purposes arguably increases 
the chances of all cable activities being unduly restricted. This, in turn, could 
impact the connectivity that we so depend on today. Thus, governments and 
the cable industry must carry out a careful cost/benefit ratio when making de-
cisions on whether to use submarine cables for intelligence gathering. After all, 
submarine cables are the backbone of the Internet and using them for this pur-
pose implicates the security of global telecommunications. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The international community’s reliance on submarine fiber optic cables can-
not be underestimated. From the Internet to phone and bank services to science 
and military uses, it is not an exaggeration to say that the submarine fiber optic 
cable has become the foundation of our modern digital society, and one of the 
most important drivers in globalization. The focus of this Article has been on 
the importance of submarine cables to security in general and to cybersecurity 
in particular. Despite this criticality, the emphasis in discussions about cyber 
security has been hitherto directed at the protection of information, and not 
about the protection of the submarine cables that transmit this information. As 
discussed above, submarine cables are vulnerable to two distinct challenges—
intentional interference with submarine cable systems by State and/or non-
State actors, as well as tools for intelligence gathering. The legal regime for the 
protection of cables from both these threats consists of a patchwork of interna-
tional conventions and customary international law and significant gaps re-
main. While intentional interference and intelligence gathering are qualitative-
ly different requiring different responses, it is undeniable that the international 
community must begin to, at the very least, start a dialogue about these issues. 
With regard to the protection of cable systems from intentional interference 
by State and/or non-State actors, this Article demonstrated that the present le-
gal regime is deficient in ensuring the security of cables. UNCLOS, the laws of 
war and terrorism conventions are capable of addressing certain aspects of the 
protection of cables, but surely critical communications infrastructure such as 
cables deserves a more comprehensive and holistic legal regime. To this end, 
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the Article proposed the adoption of an international treaty that protects sub-
marine cables, making intentional interference (be it a physical or cyberattack) 
with submarine cable systems an international crime, and including provisions 
for mutual cooperation on enforcement against such crimes. While there is al-
ways a certain amount of inertia when negotiating an international instrument, 
the cable industry and the ICPC should work together with national govern-
ments to include this issue in current discussions at the UN about cybersecuri-
ty. Framing it as a cybersecurity issue is likely to get the most traction. 
With regard to using submarine fiber optic cables for intelligence gathering, 
this raises a whole set of different issues. Using cables for intelligence gather-
ing does not necessarily result in damage to the cables—although in some cas-
es it might. Further, the practice is shrouded in mystery, particularly using ca-
bles to conduct mass or bulk surveillance. As with the protection of submarine 
cables from intentional interference, the legal regime is patchy and piecemeal, 
perhaps because intelligence gathering general subsists in the shadows of the 
law. In the context of ensuring the security of submarine communications, the 
question must be asked whether submarine cables should even be used for in-
telligence gathering purposes given how vital they have become to the world. 
While this issue is unlikely to ever be a subject of an international treaty, it is 
imperative that governments and the cable industry alike must carry out a care-
ful cost/benefit ratio when making decisions on whether to use submarine ca-
bles for intelligence gathering. In the author’s view, the risk to the submarine 
cable system may outweigh the benefits of using them for intelligence gather-
ing. 
 
